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Abstract 
Based on innovative, mixed-methods research, this article examines the entry 
of  on-demand platform models into the domestic work sector in South Africa. 
This sector has long been characterised by high levels of  informality, precarity, 
and exploitation, though recent regulatory advances have provided labour 
and social protections to some domestic workers. We locate the rise of  the 
on-demand economy within the longer-term trajectory of  domestic work in 
South Africa, identifying the ‘traditional’ sector as a key site of  undervalued 
labour. On-demand domestic work platforms create much-needed economic 
opportunities in a context of  pervasive un(der)-employment, opportunities 
that come with some incremental improvements over traditional working 
arrangements. Yet we contend that platform models maintain the patterns of  
everyday abuse found elsewhere in the domestic work sector. These models are 
premised on an ability to navigate regulatory contexts to provide clients with 
readily available, flexible labour without longer-term commitment, therefore 
sidestepping employer obligations to provide labour rights and protections. As a 
result, on-demand companies reinforce the undervalued and largely unprotected 
labour of  marginalised women domestic workers. 
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1. Introduction 
The gig economy, in which Uber-like digital platforms unite workers and 
purchasers of  their services, is expanding globally. The model requires workers 
to perform task-based ‘gigs’, mediated through digital platforms, without the 
security or benefits usually associated with formal employment.1 Though 
exponential growth is forecast in traditionally female-dominated sectors— 
notably on-demand household services including cooking, cleaning and care 
work2—relatively little research to date has focused on gendered experiences 
of  gig work outside of  North America and Europe.3 This article discusses on-
demand domestic work in South Africa. It explores platform models’ effects 
on working conditions, their impact on the three key constituents of  the gig 
economy (workers, platform companies, and clients), and the implications of  
their rise for the valuation of  domestic work.
Domestic work is persistently undervalued in South Africa (as elsewhere), where 
it is overwhelmingly the preserve of  poor black African women. However, 
the domestic work sector is relatively large, occupying 6 per cent of  the 
country’s workforce,4 and advocacy by unions and allies has led to incremental 
improvements to the regulatory framework governing the sector. Though 
these regulations are neither comprehensive nor generous—the relatively low 
entitlements they stipulate reinforce the marginal status of  domestic workers—
they have given advocates a foundation from which to argue that working 
conditions could be further improved through additional formalisation. The 
1 See V De Stefano, ‘The Rise of  the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: On-demand work, 
crowd work and labour protection in the “gig-economy”’, Comparative Labor Law and 
Policy Journal, vol. 37, issue 3, 2016, pp. 461–471; A Hunt and E Samman, Gender and 
the Gig Economy: Critical steps for evidence-based policy, Working Paper 546, Overseas 
Development Institute, London, January 2019, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.
uk/files/resource-documents/12586.pdf.
2 Projections by PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, forecast that ‘on-demand 
household services will be the fastest growing sector’ of  the gig economy in the 
European Union (EU), ‘with revenues estimated to expand at roughly 50% yearly 
through 2025’. (See J Hawksworth and R Vaughan, ‘The Sharing Economy—Sizing 
the Revenue Opportunity’, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014, http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/
megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economysizing-therevenue-
opportunity.html; R Vaughan and R Daverio, Assessing the Size and Presence of  the 
Collaborative Economy in Europe, Publications Office of  the European Union, 2016, 
cited in Hunt and Samman, p. 10.)
3 On-demand services are provided locally, with the purchaser and provider in geographic 
proximity (in contrast to crowdwork, which takes place online). 
4 ‘Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 3’, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria, October 
2018, retrieved 13 July 2020, http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/
P02113rdQuarter2018.pdf.
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ostensibly different operating model underpinning the gig economy has the 
potential to undermine this effort, and thus it is important to understand the 
impact of  its entry into the domestic work sector.
We begin by examining the characteristics of  traditional and ‘on demand’ 
domestic workers, and then explore the undervaluation of  domestic work 
within South Africa. We argue that while on-demand platforms offer some 
improvements to workers over traditional employment arrangements, their goal 
of  facilitating flexible labour leads to the continued normalisation of  the labour 
exploitation of  domestic workers. We conclude that both models undervalue 
domestic labour and perpetuate breaches in workers’ labour rights, leaving 
workers in a highly precarious position. 
Characteristics of  Domestic Workers
 
Traditional and on-demand domestic workers share many common 
characteristics. This is unsurprising, given that many on-demand workers have 
previously worked under traditional domestic work arrangements or have 
continued with traditional work alongside platform-mediated gigs. The domestic 
workforce is overwhelmingly comprised of  poor black African women.5 Indeed, 
98 per cent of  our survey respondents were female and 97 per cent were black 
African.6 Migrant workers from South Africa’s rural areas or from adjoining 
countries furthermore form a significant share of  the paid domestic workforce, 
especially in its less formalised segments.7 Finally, we should note that domestic 
workers are relatively young, although we found that platform-based workers are 
on average slightly younger. In our sample, on-demand workers had a median 
age of  35, while traditional domestic workers had a median age of  41.8 
5 L Orr and T van Meelis, ‘Women and Gender Relations in the South African Labour 
Market: A 20-year review’, Labour Research Service, Cape Town, 2014, pp. 2–27.
6 See footnote 29 below for details of  the survey methodology, including the sample 
size.
7 S Meny-Gibert and S Chiumia, ‘Factsheet: Where do South Africa’s international 
migrants come from?’, Africa Check, 16 August 2016, retrieved 13 July 2020, https://
africacheck.org/factsheets/geography-migration.
8 J Budlender, M Leibbrandt, and I Woolard, South African Poverty Lines: A review and two 
new money-metric thresholds, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 
Working Paper Series No. 151, University of  Cape Town, Cape Town, August 2015, 
http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/784/2015_151_Saldruwp.
pdf?sequence=1.
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The Undervaluation of  Domestic Work
The historical undervaluation of  domestic work is evident in both the 
traditional and on-demand models. At its core, this undervaluation stems from 
the gendered way in which the dominant economic concepts of  ‘productive’ 
and ‘unproductive’ work are differentiated. Unpaid domestic work—mostly 
carried out by women—is categorised as an element of  the ‘household and care 
economy’, and as a result domestic work is not seen as having intrinsic economic 
value. This undervaluation persists when domestic work is commodified: ‘The 
gender stereotyping of  unpaid care work, and the association of  care with 
women’s “natural” inclinations and “innate” abilities, rather than with skills 
acquired through formal education or training, lies behind the high level of  
feminization of  care employment’.9 Consequentially, ‘the fact that women’s 
unpaid domestic work has been undervalued has had a negative impact on the 
salary and working conditions of  remunerated domestic workers’.10 In other 
words, paid domestic work, which is disproportionately carried out by women, 
is perceived as an extension of  the unpaid work within the household. This has 
contributed to the frequent exclusion of  domestic work from formal labour 
relations frameworks, and therefore to its perception as ‘undeserving’ of  good 
working conditions, including decent remuneration. 
The undervaluation of  domestic work relates to the characteristics of  domestic 
workers, who are typically marginalised and subject to intersecting inequalities 
alongside continued systematic discrimination. These women experience sites 
of  power disparity that go beyond gender to include race, migratory status, and 
social class.11 In South Africa, ‘the low social status and undervalued nature 
of  domestic work has roots in the historical use of  specific racial and cultural 
groups as servants and slaves’,12 exacerbated by the racialised nature of  relations 
9 L Addati, U Cattaneo, V Esquivel, and I Valarino, ‘Care Work and Care Jobs for the 
Future of  Decent Work’, International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva, 2018, p. 
8, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/
documents/publication/wcms_633135.pdf.
10 G Labadie-Jackson, ‘Reflections on Domestic Work and the Feminization of 
Migration’, Campbell Law Review, vol. 31, issue 1, 2008,  pp. 67–90, p. 82.
11 On intersectionality in the context of  domestic work in South Africa, see D Gaitskell, 
J Kimble, M Maconachie, and E Unterhalter, ‘Class, Race and Gender: Domestic 
workers in South Africa’, Review of  African Political Economy, vol. 10, issue 27/28, 1983, 
pp. 86–108. On migratory status, see L Griffin, ‘Unravelling Rights: “Illegal” migrant 
domestic workers in South Africa’, South African Review of  Sociology, vol. 42, issue 2, 
2011, pp. 83–101, https://doi.org/10.1080/21528586.2011.582349. 
12 D du Toit and E Huysamen, ‘Implementing Domestic Workers’ Labour Rights in a 
Framework of  Transformative Constitutionalism’, in D du Toit (ed.), Exploited, 
Undervalued – and Essential: Domestic workers and the realisation of  their rights, Pretoria 
University Law Press, Pretoria, 2013, p. 79.
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between black domestic workers and their white ‘madams’,13 a pattern that has 
lingered despite Apartheid ending.14
With growing black affluence, class has featured more prominently in domestic 
worker-employer relations. Nonetheless, ‘[t]he result of  the complex interplay 
between gender, race and class is, in many cases, a perception amongst 
employers that the domestic worker is a lesser creature’.15 One outcome is the 
persistence of  paternalist relationships between domestic workers and their 
employers.16 Another is that the mobilisation of  women, which is ‘generally a 
necessary condition for changes in care-related policies’, becomes less likely.17 
The location of  domestic work also contributes to its undervaluation. Domestic 
work is largely conducted by isolated workers in the private sphere, which makes 
worker organising for better conditions with employers or stronger government 
regulation more difficult.18
It should be clear from this analysis that there are many obstacles to raising 
the value of  domestic work in South Africa. They go well beyond the gig 
economy. However, we argue that existing intersecting inequalities, discrimination, 
and power differentials tend to be reinforced in the on-demand economy, 
deepening the existing analysis of  domestic work and care platforms in the 
13 The seminal study of  this theme is J Cock, Maids & Madams: A study in the politics of 
exploitation, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1980.
14 See S Archer, ‘“Buying the Maid Ricoffy”: Domestic workers, employers and 
food’, South African Review of  Sociology, vol. 42, issue 2, 2011, pp. 66–82, https://doi.
org/10.1080/21528586.2011.582354; I du Plessis, ‘Nation, Family, Intimacy: The 
domain of  the domestic in the social imaginary’, South African Review of  Sociology, vol. 
42, issue 2, 2011 pp. 45–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/21528586.2011.582740; E Jansen, 
Like Family: Domestic workers in South African history and literature, New York University 
Press, New York, 2019.
15 Ibid., p. 191.
16 du Toit and Huysamen.
17 P Domingo, R Holmes, N Jones, and E Samman, Bridging Policy Insights: Care responsibilities 
and women’s leadership, Policy Brief, Overseas Development Institute, London, December 
2016, p. 4, retrieved 13 July 2020, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/11189.pdf.
18 However, see also S A Ally, From Servants to Workers, South African domestic workers and 
the democratic state, University of  KwaZulu-Natal Press, Scottsville, 2010. Ally argues 
that the post-Apartheid state’s regulation of  domestic work ‘depersonalised’ employer-
employee relations, thereby threatening domestic workers’ use of  personal relations 
to negotiate their working conditions, which is itself  a unique characteristic of  the 
nature of  domestic work.
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United States19 as well as India, Kenya, Mexico, and South Africa.20 
In the remainder of  this article, we demonstrate that the current operating model 
of  platforms in South Africa is likely to perpetuate the labour exploitation of  
domestic workers. The next section explores working conditions for traditional 
domestic workers. This is followed by our analysis of  the emergence of  the on- 
demand economy. This section includes our methodology, outlines our empirical 
findings on labour conditions within the on-demand sector, and analyses the 
‘winners and losers’ under this new model. We conclude with reflections on the 
policy implications of  this research. 
2. Labour Conditions in the ‘Traditional’ Sector
Working conditions for domestic workers in South Africa have been historically 
poor, characterised by informality and exploitation. There have, however, been 
recent attempts to improve the situation. Unions such as the South African 
Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union (SADSAWU) have been leading 
sustained campaigns for decent wages and adequate workers’ protection. 
Government attempts to establish a regulatory framework include the 
introduction of  ‘Sectoral Determination 7’ in 2002, which mandated a minimum 
wage and basic working conditions such as formal employment contracts and 
the compulsory registration of  workers with the Department of  Labour—a 
change that enables them to benefit from the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF). In 2013, South Africa ratified ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Work, 
setting a new benchmark for improved conditions in the sector based on the 
key pillars of  ‘decent work’. These include recognition of  domestic work as 
‘real work’, formalisation through contracts, adequate wages, social protection, 
health and safety in the workplace, and rights to organising and social 
dialogue.21 In 2018, the Department of  Labour proposed extending workers’ 
compensation to domestic workers, and in May 2019, the Pretoria High Court 
ruled that their exclusion from the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
19 N van Doorn, ‘Platform Labor: On the gendered and racialized exploitation of  low-
income service work in the “on-demand” economy’, Information, Communication & 
Society, vol. 20, issue 6, 2017, pp. 898–914, https://doi.org/10.1080/136911
8X.2017.1294194; J Ticona and A Mateescu, ‘Trusted Strangers: Carework platforms’ 
cultural entrepreneurship in the on-demand economy’, New Media & Society, vol. 20, 
issue 11, 2018, pp. 4384–4404, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818773727.
20 A Hunt and F Machingura, A Good Gig? The rise of  on-demand domestic work, Development 
Progress Working Paper 7, Overseas Development Institute, London, December 2016, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11155.pdf.
21 International Labour Organization, Convention C189: Domestic workers convention, 16 June 
2011. 
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Diseases Act of  1993 (COIDA) was unconstitutional. As of  early March 2020, 
the Constitutional Court began proceedings over whether to instruct Parliament 
to amend COIDA to include domestic workers.22
Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. While the National Minimum Wage 
Act of  2018 specified a minimum hourly wage of  ZAR 20 (approx. USD 1.40 
at the time), as of  January 2019, the minimum wage for domestic workers was 
set at only 75 per cent of  the national minimum.23 SADSAWU and other labour 
rights organisations continue to highlight the insufficiency of  this wage to 
meet the cost of  living, as well as its symbolism for the undervaluation of  
domestic work vis-à-vis other forms of  work to which a higher minimum wage 
applies. 
Implementation of  regulation also remains patchy. An unknown (but presumably 
sizeable) number of  domestic workers continue to work informally, and 
several categories of  domestic workers remain excluded from social protection 
provisions.24 For example, one recent estimate suggests that approximately 
one-third of  the domestic workers who work the requisite 24 hours or more 
per month remain unregistered with UIF.25 These include foreign individuals 
working on contracts, as well as individuals employed for less than 24 hours 
a month by a single employer—a key barrier given that many domestic 
workers work part-time for multiple employers.26 Employer non-compliance 
and domestic workers’ limited awareness of  their rights further impede 
22 ‘Why the Concourt Case for Domestic Workers is So Important – for Employers 
Too’, Eyewitness News, 10 March 2020, https://ewn.co.za/2020/03/10/why-the-
concourt-case-for-domestic-workers-is-so-important. 
23 The Sectoral Determination of  Minimum Wages for Domestic Workers (December 
2018) adds detail based on location and weekly hours worked. As of  20 March 2020, 
the minimum wage was raised to ZAR 20.76 for most workers and ZAR 15.57 for 




25 Statistics South Africa, cited in K Liao, ‘One third of  domestic workers are still not 
registered for UIF’, GroundUp, 13 June 2019, https://www.groundup.org.za/article/
one-third-domestic-workers-are-still-not-registered-uif.
26 Department of  Labour of  South Africa, ‘Unemployment Insurance Act No. 63 of 
2001’, Republic of  South African Government Gazette, vol. 439, no. 23064, 28 January 2002, 
pp. 1–66, https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a63-010.
pdf.
A Hunt and E Samman
109
implementation.27 Other persistent protection gaps include medical care, pension, 
employment injury benefit, and family benefit.28
3. The On-Demand Economy: Labour conditions, winners 
and losers
The entry of  digital platforms into the domestic work sector in South Africa 
builds upon an established model while also adding new features. Compared to 
other options open to domestic workers (notably but not exclusively traditional 
domestic work arrangements), digital platforms offer some positive features that 
workers value and which improve their working conditions. However, workers 
also identified several ways in which the on-demand model perpetuates their 
precarious working conditions. 
The data that informs this article was collected as part of  a broader two-year 
research project exploring gender and the gig economy in Kenya and South 
Africa.29 In South Africa, novel methods of  data collection included a nine- 
round, automated voice response (AVR) survey with workers active on a 
domestic work platform, and the analysis of  data from this same company.30 
It should be underlined that while the platform provided access to its data and 
contact information for registered workers, the study was fully independent: the 
survey was conducted through an independent company who secured consent 
from workers to survey them and anonymised the data that was collected. The 
27 J Gobind, G du Plessis, and W Ukpere, ‘Perceptions of  Domestic Worker Towards 
the Basic Conditions of  Employment Act of  South Africa’, Journal of  Social Sciences, 
vol. 37, 2013, pp. 225–235, https://doi.org/10.1080/09718923.2013.11893221.
28 I Ortiz (ed.), ‘Social Protection for Domestic Workers: Key policy trends and statistics’, 
Social Protection Policy Papers No. 16, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 
2016, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---soc_sec/
documents/publication/wcms_458933.pdf. 
29 A Hunt, E Samman, S Tapfuma, G Mwaura, R Omenya, K Kay, S Stevano, and A 
Roumer, Women and the Gig Economy: Paid work, care and flexibility in Kenya and South Africa, 
Overseas Development Institute, London, 2019, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.
uk/files/resource-documents/women_in_the_gig_economy_final_digital.pdf.
30 Nearly 650 workers (around one-third of  the total) who were on the platform as of 
August 2018 responded to an invitation to complete the first round of  a survey 
covering their background and motivations for engaging with the platform. We could 
not investigate self-selection into the survey nor non-response comprehensively 
because, for privacy reasons, the platform deliberately collected minimal personal 
details regarding registered workers. Subsequent response rates varied between 25% 
and 42% for the first five rounds of  the survey, after which we had to reduce the 
sample size due to budgetary restrictions and a rise in the price of  mobile phone 
airtime. See Hunt et al. for more details.
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study also involved qualitative interviews with workers who were active or had 
previously been active on gig platforms (16 direct interviews and one focus 
group discussion comprised of  10 participants). We also conducted three key 
informant interviews, with a team of  academics, one domestic worker union 
representative, and one platform representative.
Several domestic work-focused platforms exist in South Africa. Although 
platforms evolve and change regularly, they typically offer a smartphone-operated 
app that allows clients to access the profiles of  workers whose availability and 
profile match their preferences for domestic service provision. These same 
apps also offer ways for workers to sign up, manage gigs, and receive payment. 
At the time of  data collection, the platform studied for this research enabled 
clients to make bookings of  three hours or more and gave them a way to tip 
workers. On the worker side, it offered an hourly rate based on their tenure 
with the platform and a premium for taking on gigs cancelled by others. The 
platform’s method of  recruitment included an application and selection process, 
migration status and criminal record checks, and orientation sessions on using 
the platform. It covered the cost of  cleaning supplies, while workers paid for 
transport and the cost of  their airtime (the platform has since developed a data- 
free app, eliminating airtime costs for workers).31 
Labour Conditions in On-Demand Domestic Work 
Our exploration of  the conditions of  gig work focused on: earnings and income 
stability; flexibility in the location and timing of  work; safety and security; social 
protection; opportunities for learning and the professionalisation of  service 
provision; and possibilities for collective organisation and bargaining. We briefly 
outline our findings on each in turn.
Earnings and Income Stability
Our analysis demonstrates that, as of  December 2018, workers on the platform 
with five days of  availability were earning ZAR 900 (USD 65) on average per 
week. This was around 45-50 per cent higher than the minimum wage for 
domestic workers (working at least 27 hours per week) of  ZAR 616 (USD 45), 
but it still falls short of  the amount needed for a family of  four to exceed the 
poverty line (estimated at between ZAR 1,031 and ZAR 1,319 per week per 
31 Detailed information is provided in Hunt et al. 
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member).32 Moreover, the overhead financial costs of  gig work—e.g. airtime 
and transport costs between gigs—depress platform-based earnings. 
Most survey respondents (84 per cent) reported being their household’s primary 
earner, while nearly all (95 per cent) had financial dependents. Many also signalled 
that their household incomes were insufficient to meet their basic needs and 
financial responsibilities. Utilisation rates for ‘full-time’ workers (those available 
for work five or more days weekly) averaged around 60 per cent over a one-year 
period.33 In addition, the irregularity in receiving bookings meant that some gig 
workers experienced significant changes in their incomes from week to week, as 
demonstrated in average variation from mean earnings of  close to 50 per cent 
weekly. Some workers fared better than others on the platform. The top 10 per 
cent of  full-time workers were taking on around one quarter of  the available 
hours of  work carried out by full-time workers, with this ‘success’ linked to 
ratings, length of  tenure on the platform, and being relatively more available to 
take up gigs.
Nevertheless, over half  of  survey respondents (56 per cent) reported being 
satisfied or very satisfied with their pay. A significant share also reported that 
their hourly earnings were higher than they would have been in other types 
of  work: 37 per cent reported that working through the platform was more 
lucrative than other jobs on an hourly basis, and 40 per cent indicated this was 
‘sometimes’ the case. 
Once registered, gig workers tended to engage in other forms of  paid work 
alongside platform work. Around half  (52 per cent) of  survey respondents 
reported having an additional job or business, or that they also worked for 
another platform. However, the platform typically provided the bulk of  workers’ 
income: 73 per cent identified the platform as the main source of  their earnings 
in the previous month. Participants in face-to-face interviews mentioned 
having recently undertaken other types of  casual or informal work, with several 
reporting street vending, working in shops, and commercial cleaning work. 
However, paid domestic work was the most frequently cited work engaged in 
32 Between June 2018 and mid-September 2019, weekly earnings for workers with five 
or more days’ availability per week, excluding voluntary ‘days off ’, averaged ZAR 900. 
Estimates of  household income needed for a household of  four to exceed the poverty 
line are ZAR 5,276 (Finn, 2015) and ZAR 4,125 per month (Budlender et al., 2015). 
A Finn, A National Minimum Wage in the Context of  the South African Labour Market, 
National Minimum Wage Research Initiative, Working Paper Series, No. 1, University 
of  the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, August 2015, retrieved 13 July 2020, http://
opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/786/2015_153_Saldruwp.pdf; 
Budlender et al.; Hunt et al.
33 We computed utilisation rates, discounting voluntary ‘days off ’ between November 
2017 and December 2018.
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before joining the platform, whether live-in or day labour within private homes, 
sometimes obtained via an agency, and many continued to provide domestic 
labour through traditional means alongside gig work. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that despite gig earnings being inadequate, they are still better 
than other options—notably domestic work in traditional households. 
Flexibility
Flexibility in line with workers’ preferences is a core offering platform companies 
advertise to their workforce. It is often portrayed as particularly advantageous 
to women due to the potential it offers to balance paid work with unpaid care 
and domestic work.34 We found some evidence of  workers being able to work 
on days that they preferred—92 per cent of  survey respondents reported having 
worked on convenient days during the previous week and 88 per cent reported 
having worked at convenient times.
Yet our interviews suggested mixed experiences among workers. Several 
interviewees agreed that platform work was more flexible than other types of  
work, including traditional domestic work. Alongside low pay in previous roles 
and/or persistent unemployment, this flexibility was cited as a reason to join the 
platform. However, this ostensible flexibility must be interpreted alongside other 
features of  the platform model. First, the model allows platforms and clients 
to contract workers only when they need them. This means that the platform 
can respond to fluctuating demand at minimal cost, and that client demand 
for bookings de facto take precedence over workers’ timing preferences. Second, 
the ability of  clients both to book and cancel cleaners on an ad hoc basis—a 
key aspect attracting clients to the platform model—introduces considerable 
uncertainty for workers. Third, fixing gig booking lengths in advance increases 
the likelihood that clients will insist on more work than can reasonably be done 
in the agreed time, putting pressure on workers to acquiesce or risk being rated 
negatively and/or lose the client entirely. 
The location of  gigs was also a challenge. The persistent legacy of  racial 
and economic segregation in South Africa means that many workers live in 
townships or other low-income areas. These are geographically far away from 
the more affluent neighbourhoods of  their clients, and travelling between the 
34 E Bardasi and Q Wodon, ‘Working Long Hours and Having No Choice: Time poverty 
in Guinea’, Feminist Economics, vol. 16, issue 3, 2010, pp. 45–78, https://doi.org/10.1
080/13545701.2010.508574; T D Allen, R C Johnson, K M Kiburz, and K M Shockley, 
‘Work–Family Conflict and Flexible Work Arrangements: Deconstructing flexibility’, 
Personnel Psychology, vol. 66, issue 2, 2013, pp. 345–376, https://doi.org/10.1111/
peps.12012; M Hilbrecht and D Lero, ‘Self-Employment and Family Life: Constructing 
work–life balance when you’re “always on”’, Community, Work & Family, vol. 17, issue 
1, 2014, pp. 20–42, https://doi.org.10.1080/13668803.2013.862214; Hunt et al. 
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two on public transport is rarely easy. While workers can specify on the platform 
where they wish to work, this aspect of  flexibility was often shaped by logistical 
and/or financial concerns. 
Safety and Security
As in the traditional sector, violence against on-demand domestic workers is a 
concern. On-demand domestic work also comes with safety risks particular to 
providing services to a range of  different and unknown clients in their homes.35 
Some workers reported instances of  rude, aggressive, or abusive treatment 
while working behind closed doors. The physical urban environment in South 
Africa, characterised by long distances, poor transport links, and extremely high 
levels of  crime and insecurity, presents further risks. Early gig start times were 
raised multiple times as a safety issue, and workers reported several instances of  
armed and aggressive robbery while travelling to and from gigs.
Labour and Social Protection
A chief  critique of  gig platforms is that the classification of  workers as 
‘independent contractors’ (which denies them the status of  employees) restricts 
their access to labour and contributory social protections, while removing the 
need for platforms to make contributions on their behalf.36 The model does 
not guarantee entitlements mandated within South Africa’s domestic worker 
employee regulation. Moreover, platform company representatives frequently 
express aversion to becoming recognised employers (as opposed to technology 
companies, as discussed further below), although some have extended basic 
protections to workers through limited private schemes. The relatively progressive 
platform involved in this research, for example, had instituted various measures 
aimed at improving working conditions, including making accidental death and 
disability coverage available to workers via a private insurance company.
Workers’ status on the platform meant that routine life events risk further 
exacerbating economic precariousness. Workers often had limited or no income 
during maternity periods in which they could not work, which was especially 
pertinent since a majority were single mothers. Furthermore, workers’ coverage 
by public social protection was low: the platform’s polling of  its workforce in 
2019 suggested that just 5 per cent of  on-demand domestic workers reported 
being registered for UIF (which would give them access to public maternity 
benefits), while 32 per cent did not know whether or not they were registered.37 
35 Hunt and Machingura.
36 De Stefano.
37 Key informant interview, platform representative.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 15 (2020): 102-121
114
Learning and the Professionalisation of  Service Provision
Workers expressed satisfaction with the professional development the platform 
afforded; 91 per cent of  survey respondents believed that the work they did 
through the platform gave them opportunities for ‘learning on the job’. The 
model also appeared to enable a significant share of  workers—26 per cent— 
to pursue studies alongside work. The platform representative we interviewed 
spoke of  plans to provide training in soft skills such as scheduling and customer 
interaction. Despite this, attempts to professionalise on-demand domestic work, 
including through increasing and certifying worker skills, have not yet translated 
into widespread increased valuation of  workers or the labour they provide. 
Some evidence suggests that investing in skills development, certification, and 
other forms of  domestic work ‘professionalisation’ is important for increasing 
its societal and economic valuation.38 Indeed, the platform we collaborated with 
had sought to challenge client perceptions of  domestic work as a low-value 
commodity by presenting it as professional service meriting ‘above market’ 
rates.39 But although the company had started out with higher prices for clients, 
they did not make bookings until prices were lowered. ‘Razor thin margins and no 
willingness to pay’ among clients made raising earnings an extremely challenging 
proposition for the start-up company.40 Moreover, several interviewees spoke 
of  a continued lack of  respect and poor treatment from clients, suggesting on- 
demand models have not caused clients to value domestic workers more. 
Collective Organisation and Bargaining 
Formal gig-worker organisation is nascent in South Africa, with few signs 
of  successful collective action in the on-demand domestic work sector.41 
Indeed, the platform model excludes workers from fundamental labour rights 
such as freedom of  association, collective bargaining, or protection against 
discrimination or unfair dismissal. None of  our survey respondents reported 
membership in any formal group that would advocate for their rights: 32 
per cent said they did not know how to join such a group and 26 per cent 
felt that such organisations were for workers in the ‘formal economy’. While 
SADSAWU reported receiving some complaints from platform workers, it had 
not yet had the capacity to focus on them. It also noted that workers would 
38 Addati et al., 2018.
39 Key informant interview, platform representative.
40 Ibid.
41 With notable exceptions, such as the legal case against Uber in South Africa discussed 
above, which the company later successfully appealed. 
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need to be members of  the union to receive structured assistance.42 That said, 
many workers reported being in informal communication with one another: 74 
per cent reported interacting with others on a regular basis, most commonly 
through WhatsApp. While certainly a source of  support to these workers in lieu 
of  other options, the informal nature of  these private groups—and lack of  any 
formal organising or bargaining mechanism—prevents them from transforming 
into meaningful collective action. 
Winners and Losers of  On-Demand Domestic Work 
Building on the analysis of  working conditions, this section explores beneficiaries 
and losers from the rise of  on-demand domestic work. We consider three core 
constituencies: workers, companies, and clients. The core challenge for workers 
in South Africa is that of  employment ‘quality vs. quantity’. Although platforms 
play a growing role in generating paid work, some clearly provide better 
conditions than others—as evident in the results of  the University of  Oxford’s 
‘Fairwork’ index, which ranks platform companies according to principles 
covering fairness in pay, health and safety provisions, contracting, management, 
and representation.43 Nonetheless, even where platform representatives 
report a wish to provide quality economic opportunities, a context of  high 
unemployment, informality, and a weak regulatory environment make it possible 
for decent work standards to remain unmet. Clients are likely to benefit from 
securing flexible on-demand domestic work with few employer obligations. 
Workers
The chief  motivation for domestic workers to engage in gig work in South 
Africa, despite the multiple challenges it presents, appears to be economic 
necessity. It is important to recall the broader structural constraints that limit 
the availability and quality of  work available to marginalised and disadvantaged 
women in South Africa, including an economy characterised by widespread 
un(der)employment and informality, persistent discrimination, and a challenging 
physical urban environment. Many interviewees highlighted a lack of  other 
options and reported that platform work offered them some tangible benefits 
over both unemployment and the other forms of  work realistically available to 
them. These included higher hourly earnings, some choice over work hours, and 
having an intermediary between them and clients. Indeed, 91 per cent of  survey 
42 Key informant interview, SADSAWU representative.
43 A Badger, J Woodcock, M Graham, and S Englert, The Five Pillars of  Fairwork: Labour 
standards in the platform economy, Fairwork Foundation, October 2019, https://fair.work/
wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2019/10/Fairwork-Y1-Report.pdf; See also Hunt et 
al., p. 73, Box 10.
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respondents reported that gig work gave them greater freedom and control 
in their work. From this perspective, any constraints to platform operations 
through further regulation are likely to restrict workers’ economic opportunities, 
under a model that many perceive as having relative advantages. 
This backdrop is hardly promising for improvements in working conditions, 
even where platforms seek to charge higher rates to clients than in the traditional 
sector and pass on (some of) this surplus to workers. The traditional domestic 
sector has been a key source of  work for many marginalised women in South 
Africa, and platform companies are fully cognisant that they are operating 
within a context of  poor labour conditions. Indeed, platforms are reliant on 
having a large pool of  workers willing to provide cheap and readily available 
labour. This means that their offering can come with only minimal security, 
rights, and protections, and it will in some ways be better than what is found in 
the traditional sector. In other words, it is a relatively better option. But by neither 
fully meeting workers’ needs nor by advancing a quality work framework, it can 
also be argued that they are helping to maintain the traditionally inadequate 
working conditions that have long characterised domestic work. Indeed, they 
can do this because weak regulatory institutions (and enforcement), widespread 
unemployment (currently averaging 30 per cent for women),44 and deeply 
entrenched structural challenges give workers little choice but to take whatever 
paid work comes their way. 
Lack of  protections typify South Africa’s informal economy (and other low- and 
middle-income contexts). But what distinguishes the platform economy is that 
these are built in by design. Domestic work, as we have seen, provides an income 
to the most insecure workers who often lack other forms of  social protection, 
such as living in a household with a member who has social insurance or who 
receives a government grant. Only 27 per cent of  our survey respondents lived 
in households receiving a South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) grant 
(while 12 per cent were unsure), compared with 70 per cent of  households 
nationally. It follows that these workers are most in need of  the rights and 
protections that employee status would confer. 
The platform has provided limited protections to workers, including privately- 
provided microinsurance for accident and disability coverage, instead of  
contributions to public social protection which would normally be provided 
by employers. However, public schemes are more likely to confer protection 
upon workers, while ‘more individualized forms of  protection, such as private 
insurance or individual accounts, do not comply with most social security 
44 ‘Unemployment Drops in the Fourth Quarter of  2018’, Statistics South Africa, 13 
February 2019, retrieved 13 July 2020, http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11897.
A Hunt and E Samman
117
principles, and therefore are outside the core of  social protection systems’.45 
Indeed, the privatisation wave in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the 
underperformance of  such schemes and raised serious doubts about an 
increased role for private provision.46 Accordingly, public social protection 
systems financed through an appropriate blend of  taxes and contributions are 
more likely to guarantee adequate social protection, ensure fiscal and economic 
sustainability, and give due regard to social justice and equity. Such an approach 
has the potential to promote a stronger social contract by allowing for risk 
pooling and redistribution among different groups within the population.47 
Behrendt et al. conclude that ‘proposals that weaken social insurance in favour 
of  private insurance and individual savings arrangements, with their limited 
potential for risk pooling and redistribution, will likely increase poverty, 
especially for vulnerable low-income earners and those with non-linear work 
careers, and exacerbate inequality, including gender gaps, and thus can only be 
voluntary mechanisms to complement stable, equitable and mandatory social 
insurance benefits’.48
The delinking of  platform companies from social insurance is not inevitable. 
GoJek, the largest gig platform in Indonesia, is notable for having developed the 
pioneering SWADAYA programme in 2018 in partnership with the country’s 
public social security system, which adds a social insurance contribution to 
the price of  its services.49 However, because it voluntarily opts to provide 
this scheme rather than being mandated to do so by law, it has the option of  
changing or revoking the programme at any time.
In short, even if  workers perceive short term benefits from engaging in platform 
work, the concern is that its operating model could undermine legislative gains 
achieved within the traditional sector in the longer term. In turn, this could 
worsen working conditions and make workers dependent on company goodwill 
rather than concrete entitlements to labour rights and government social 
45 C Behrendt, Q A Nguyen, and U Rani, ‘Social Protection Systems and the Future of 
Work: Ensuring social security for digital platform workers’, International Social Security 
Review, vol. 72, issue 3, 2019, pp. 17–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/issr.12212.
46 Ortiz, cited in Behrendt et al.
47 L Addati, F Bonnet, E Ernst, R Merola and P M J Wan, Women at Work: Trends 2016, 




49 A Coupez, ‘Sharing Economy: A drive to success – The case of  GO-JEK in Jakarta, 
Indonesia’, Research Master’s Thesis, Supervisors: C Brognaux and C Lejeune, Louvain 
School of  Management, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017, retrieved 13 July 
2020, http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/thesis:12596.
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protection. Domestic work is inherently insecure work in which marginalised 
women are overrepresented, yet their lack of  power and socio-economic 
marginalisation means they are too often excluded from such protections, 
especially since they often do not qualify as or are not recognised as employees. 
Indeed, this motivated a long-fought effort by domestic worker unions and 
other allies in South Africa, leading to one of  the strongest regulatory and social 
protection frameworks for traditional domestic work globally, which the on- 
demand economy risks undermining. 
Companies
The legal framework underpinning gig work is a recurring challenge. Should gig 
workers be classified as employees and platform companies as their employers? 
This issue’s importance is reflected in litigation seeking the application of  
regulation and/or confirmation of  employee status (with its associated 
protections and benefits), which is being pursued by workers and labour 
advocates in many countries. Some analysts argue that on-demand models 
herald a new form of  working which renders current regulatory approaches 
ambiguous or even obsolete, and that a new classification is needed.50 Others 
argue instead that such a reappraisal would merely undermine existing standards 
by evading the application of  current sectoral regulation.51
Legislative debates over gig workers’ employment status in South Africa have 
been confined to the ridesharing sector, most notably a case for unfair dismissal 
brought against Uber by deactivated drivers in 2017. Despite Uber’s defence 
that drivers were not employees, and therefore could not be dismissed, the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) ruled in 
the drivers’ favour—although the decision was later overturned on appeal. So 
far, this burgeoning advocacy has not led to the wholesale recategorisation of  
gig workers as employees. This means that platform companies ‘win’ from the 
growing gig economy chiefly by positioning themselves as brokers between 
clients and workers, rather than as employers. They capture value from workers’ 
labour by charging commissions on gigs, while at the same time circumventing 
the responsibility to uphold labour rights and contribute to social insurance on 
workers’ behalf. Per Aloisi and De Stefano, ‘the lack of  compliance with labour- 
50 For more discussion, see A Aloisi and V De Stefano, ‘Regulation and the Future of 
Work: The employment relationship as an innovation facilitator’, International Labour 
Review, vol. 159, issue 1, 2020, pp. 47–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12160. 
51 V De Stefano and A Aloisi, ‘European Legal Framework for “Digital Labour 
Platforms”’, Joint Research Centre Report, Publications Office of  the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2018, https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
bitstream/JRC112243/jrc112243_legal_framework_digital_labour_platforms_final.
pdf. 
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related, fiscal, and social security duties constitutes platforms’ main competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis their competitors... [resulting in] … an exacerbation of  
social precariousness as platform workers have very limited access to labour 
protection’.52
Platform companies, in turn, argue that innovation is needed to provide 
employment (particularly in high unemployment contexts like South Africa); that 
they provide their own support to workers where viable (e.g. private insurance); 
and that their operating model bolsters work quality in settings where poor 
quality work is endemic. They contend that any attempt to reclassify users of  
their platform as employees would severely hamper their profit-making ability, 
due to the attendant obligations in terms of  worker taxation and employee 
contributions, and consequentially jeopardise their very existence and therefore 
the economic opportunities they facilitate. 
Furthermore, by arguing that they need a favourable operating environment to 
‘create’ jobs, platform companies may reduce the South African government’s 
political will to carry out oversight. The government may well gamble that 
it is more politically expedient to support the creation of  ‘digital jobs’ amid 
high unemployment, as Kenya’s government has done,53 than to increase 
the regulation of  labour conditions and taxation. Indeed, a ‘social partners’ 
framework agreement for addressing South Africa’s unemployment crisis 
through ‘broad-based improvement in the business environment and conditions 
for entrepreneurial development’ and strong encouragement of  ‘adopters of  
new technology to use innovation as a means to save and grow jobs’ was agreed 
during the national Presidential Jobs Summit held in October 2018, with scant 
reference to job quality.54
In short, there is a strong case that the profit-making model of  on-demand 
companies in South Africa currently depends on the historic inability of  
domestic workers to establish a de facto employment relationship (and the 
better conditions that accompany it), as well as poor enforcement of  existing 
regulations governing traditional domestic work. If  these challenges were tackled 
in a meaningful way, companies would likely be obliged to emulate traditional 
employers in paying employee taxes and UIF contributions, which could in turn 
lead them to reduce the opportunities available (e.g. to ensure no worker gets 
over 24 hours per month work, which would render them exempt from having 
to pay UIF contributions). 
52 Ibid., p. 5.
53 Hunt and Machingura.
54 Republic of  South Africa, The Presidential Jobs Summit Framework Agreement 4 October 
2018, retrieved 13 July 2020, http://nedlac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
presidential-jobs-summit-framework-agreement-4-October-2018.pdf.
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Clients
At the time of  writing, the platform charged its clients a variable rate that 
depended on the number of  hours booked—ranging from ZAR 48 (USD 
3.48) per hour for a four-hour booking to ZAR 30.5 (USD 2.21) per hour for 
a ten-hour booking, which represents the maximum length. This is clearly far 
higher than the government-mandated minimum wage for domestic workers 
(ZAR 16.03 [USD 1.16] hourly for a worker employed for fewer than 27 
hours weekly, per the 2018 Sectoral Determination). However, the higher 
hourly cost to clients of  hiring a platform worker is offset by lower transaction 
costs, e.g. those associated with selecting, screening, and supervising a worker 
found independently. This is a key attribute of  the on-demand model that was 
highlighted by a platform representative we interviewed. They explained that, 
by allowing the platform to carry out these processes, clients were ensured a 
‘professionalised’ service in return for paying higher prices. In addition, clients 
avoided the economic commitment of  guaranteeing employment for a set 
number of  hours’ work and bureaucratic processes associated with being an 
employer as stipulated by South African labour law. Therefore, it could be 
argued that, from a client perspective, an important advantage of  the platform 
model is that it de facto provides a service that evades compliance with labour 
or social security regulations. Such a trend significantly threatens the hard-won 
gains of  the domestic worker movement and risks eroding the better-quality 
formal jobs where they exist, should the platform economy secure a sizable 
market share. This is likely to impact negatively upon the cohort of  domestic 
workers who remain relatively marginalised but have managed to secure access 
to higher standards and securities in the traditional sector. 
4. Conclusion 
At present, neither the traditional nor the on-demand models can be said 
to offer decent domestic work. In both spheres higher standards and their 
enforcement are needed to redress historical power inequalities and ongoing 
breaches of  the labour rights of  South Africa’s domestic workforce. The 
trajectory of  the gig economy to date suggests that platform companies, with 
an inherent profit motive, are unlikely to lead the charge towards a wide-scale 
revaluation of  domestic work; nor are household purchasers of  workers’ 
labour. Broader societal reforms are therefore needed to shift the social norms 
underpinning the discrimination and structural inequality characteristic of  the 
domestic work sector. Government action is also needed, so that traditional 
domestic workers benefit from the same labour protections as workers in other 
more highly valued sectors, and to ensure that existing regulation is enforced 
in the platform economy. Indeed, without compliance with labour rights and 
protections, on-demand workers are unlikely to benefit fully from ‘collective 
bargaining, protection from unfair dismissal and all the legal protection that 
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goes with formal employment that goes in inverted commas if  and when they 
become employees’, per a Social Law Project representative.55
As it stands, incremental improvements notwithstanding, we find that on- 
demand models can be seen as largely ‘more of  the same’. They capitalise 
on the undervalued labour of  marginalised women workers and uphold the 
power held by the purchasers of  their labour that characterise the traditional 
sector. Therefore, the platform economy represents a continuation of  the 
normalisation of  the labour exploitation of  domestic workers. It is critical to 
extend labour and social protections to all domestic workers in a sustainable 
and comprehensive way, for which an increased societal valuation of  domestic 
work—and workers—is a prerequisite. Policy-makers and platform companies 
have a central role to play in ensuring these rights, which notably include 
regular, fair, and adequate earnings, facilitating access to public social protection, 
ensuring their health and safety, and supporting collective action to ensure that 
policy and practice reflect workers’ own priorities.
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